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Introduction
A general feature accompanying transition of formerly planned economies has been a raise in economic and social inequality. Although some forms of disparities existed also before transition (Milanovic, 1998) , the shift towards market economies allowed existing visible and hidden inequalities to develop, and new inequalities to unfold. Distributional patterns in the 90s for the Central and Eastern European and post-Soviet Union countries proceeded at a quite different pace, attaining (and in some cases stabilising at) diversified levels after two decades of reforms.
The drivers of inequality are in general very difficult to discern since distributive outcomes are the converging point of the many economic, demographic and structural forces into play. This complexity is of course enhanced by the massive institutional and structural change occurred in formerly socialist countries. The aim of this paper is to investigate whether and to what extent inequality dynamics can be attributed to the different reform approaches adopted.
An extensive literature has analysed the economic effects of alternative patterns of transition towards market economy. However, in cross-country analyses, the impacts on income inequality have received much less attention compared to growth performance.
Distributional aspects in transition, on the other hand, have been largely and deeply analysed and discussed, either in theoretical terms or empirically. In this paper we analyse the effects of reforms on inequality explicitly considering their speed and sequencing. To this aim, we assembled a panel dataset of 27 transition economies from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the former Soviet Union (FSU) for the years 1989-2006.
Income inequality measures are regressed against a set of control variables and indicators of speed and sequencing of transition reforms derived by the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) transition scores.
The paper is organised as follows. In the next section we provide the conceptual and theoretical background of our study, reviewing the main antecedent attempts to identify, classify and measure the various patterns of transition implemented in (CEE) and in (FSU) countries (section 2.1). In section 2.2 we briefly report on the most important and influential contributions on income inequality dynamics during transition. In Section 3 we provide descriptive evidence on inequality in the countries and years considered and describe the approach adopted to identify the various models of transition.
Section 4 presents the empirical model relating reform patterns to inequality, the econometric approach and the outcomes. Section 5 concludes.
Theoretical and Empirical Background
Transition Patterns: Speed and Sequencing of Reforms
While economic and political theory was familiar with the causes and the processes of transformation of capitalist societies into centrally planned systems, the reverse direction of change has largely taken economists and policy makers by surprise. As a result, actual transition patterns at the beginning of the 90s turned out quite diversified and were classified by the early and subsequent extensive literature into two main groups which, under different labels, basically reflected the pace of reforms (e.g., Murrell, 1992; Popov, 2000) . However, as transition proceeded, scholars became increasingly aware that the emphasis on the speed of reforms only (gradualism -or incremental, versus shock therapy -or big bang approach) would have been a too narrow and limited perspective (Roland, 2000 and , since transition involved many other dimensions, related to complementarity/substitutability of reforms, their possible reversibility in view of needed adjustments, and political economy sustainability (Marangos, 2005) .
Starting from mid-90s, the debate has indeed started to increasingly centre also upon which sequencing of reforms was more desirable, even though the focus on their speed remained largely prevalent especially in growth studies. We will refer here mainly to these contributions since we are not aware of papers directly considering the impact of speed and sequencing of reforms on income inequality. Among the very first contributions, Fischer et al. (1996) and de Melo et al. (1997) used a cumulative liberalisation index (averaging progress in price and trade liberalisation, privatisation and banking reforms) in growth regressions, concluding that more speedy reforms were beneficial to growth. The use of this index, which basically does not separate the effect of the reform levels and of earlier reforms, received various criticisms (e.g., Staehr, 2005) . Subsequent attempts to provide more accurate measurement of the speed of reform were, for example, Berg et al. (1999) , Wolf (1999) , Heybey and Murell (1999) and Godoy and Stiglitz (2006) . We will consider this literature more in depth in section 3. Aspects related to sequencing were far less dealt with (Havrylyshyn, 2001) , also due to the difficulties to proxy it. Only a few studies addressed these aspects explicitly, for example by comparing the effects of aggregate and single reform indicators (Havrylyshyn et al., 1998) ; including in the regressions interaction terms of reform indicators (Zinnes et al., 2001) ; measuring bundling/unbundling of reforms with their standard deviation (Lora, 2000) ; or by using principal component analysis to identify sets of reforms implemented simultaneously (Staehr, 2005) . One recent paper directly measuring how the probability of reform progress in one area is affected by progress already achieved in other fields is Barlow and Radulescu (2005) .
Although we are not aware of studies explicitly considering the effects of reforms speed and sequencing on income inequality patterns, the vast literature on others aspects of transition inherently touches distributive aspects and provides useful insights. For example, in the optimal speed of transition (OST) literature (Aghion and Blanchard, 1994; Blanchard and Kremer, 1997; Boeri, 2000) it is the wages decline resulting from the shrinking of the public sector that busts the profit prospects of potential newcomers and their entry into the private sector. Therefore, the speed of transition drives the size of the unemployment pool and the extent of wages decline; at the same time, the final equilibrium, as well as the net distributive outcomes during transition, also depend on the countervailing role played by the social support granted to unemployed in the first place. Similarly, the literature supporting gradualism via political economy arguments in a median voter environment, maintains that reform patterns should also care to preserve acceptable levels of social cohesion and to avoid excessive inequality, which are most likely to create aversion to further reforms, feed pressures for redistribution, or generate political instability (Roland, 2001) . This latter argument implies that not only speed, but also an appropriate sequencing should be designed to avoid inequality outburst, which is likely to prevent further steps forward of the reform process, therefore envisaging the possible endogeneity of reforms with respect to inequality.
Income Inequality in Transition
Although at the early stages of transition inequality received relatively less attention compared with other aspects (Roland, 2001 ) an extensive literature has been developing on this field in more recent years. We only aim here at recalling the main contributions with empirical cross-country contents and those more relevant to the aims of the paper 1 .
Undoubtedly, the first comprehensive work on the subject was the book by Milanovic (1998) . Among many insights, his main general findings were that: (a) inequality increased remarkably during transition but with significantly different patterns and rates across countries; (b) increasing wage inequality was everywhere the main driver of income inequality surge; (c) private income sources other than wages contributed little to inequality with the exception of a few countries; (d) social transfers played a minor countervailing role, with pensions that were paradoxically pro-inequality in some countries of Central Europe and in especially in Russia. Similar outcomes were provided in Milanovic (1999) . A comparably extensive work was that by Flemming and Micklewright (2000) , who equally concluded for a generalized increase of inequality during transition; however, while most of countries stabilized at OECD average levels (at the end of 90s), Russia and other former Soviet Union countries went far beyond. Both these works also emphasized the great difficulty in obtaining comparable data, and this explains the fact that, also in ensuing years, only a limited literature dealing with crosscountry analysis has developed. Among the most important ones, Grün and Klasen (2001) provide an international and intertemporal analysis of well-being during transition, accounting for distributive patterns. They conclude that well-being levels in the scrutinized countries fell sharply during transition since generalized output decline was accompanied by increasing income inequality. The same authors (Grün and Klasen, 2011 ) also found that well-being levels after two decades of transition stabilized at levels similar or lower than those under central planning. Another recent paper considering well-being rankings in European transition countries vis-à-vis the old EU members, but 1 Comprehensive and reference theoretical models of inequality in transition can be found in Ferreira (1999) and Aghion and Commander (1999) . An extensive empirical literature on inequality dynamics in single European or former Soviet Union countries has been emerging in the last decade. See Aristei and Perugini (2011) for a review.
using a multidimensional approach and country specific estimates of inequality aversion parameters, is that by Aristei and Perugini (2010) . As regards subjective well-being, Selezneva (2011) provides a comprehensive review about happiness and satisfaction studies on income, work and family life in transition countries. Ivaschenko (2002) finds that, during the 90s, development level was associated with higher inequality in Eastern Europe, but with lower inequality in former Soviet Hölscher (2006) finds that while in Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland inequality remained relatively stable in the 90s, it increased remarkably in Russia, where in particular the share of profits declined as opposed to the share of transfers, the importance of wage having remained relatively stable. Emphasis is also posed on the possible role of informal economy on the true dynamics of inequality (on this point, see also Rosser et al., 2000) .
Lastly, we briefly report on three recent papers that explicitly deal with the distributive impact of policy measures. Giammatteo (2006) 
Inequality Dynamics in Transition and Reform Patterns
In this section we first present a brief description of the data used and a snapshot on income inequality patterns during transition (3.1). Then we discuss the approach used to represent quantitatively the various transition patterns (3.2) and their expected effects on inequality (3.3).
Data and Descriptive Analysis on Inequality Dynamics
Our empirical analysis refers to 27 transition countries for the period 1989-2006.
For descriptive purposes we classify these countries into the following groups: New EU Member Countries (NEUM), which joined the EU between 2004 and 2007; (b) Former Soviet Republics (FSR), which are full or associate members of the Commonwealth of Independent States; (c) Western Balkan Countries (WBK) (see Table A1 in the appendix for the list of countries and acronyms used). Our main data sources are: Table A1 . As a reference, average OECD countries Gini coefficient increased from 29.3% in the mid-80s to 31.3% in the mid-2000s, whereas for the western EU countries it increased from 27.7% to 29.3% (OECD, 2008) . The NEUM countries at the outset of transition were characterized by inequality at around 20-25 Gini points, with the exception of the Baltic Countries, and experienced remarkably different rates of inequality increase. The Czech and the Slovak Republic, in particular, were able to keep their inequality growth at a minimum; to a lower extent this was also the case for Hungary and Slovenia. In the remaining countries income inequality rose more sharply, in a few cases exceeding 35% (Romania, Estonia and Lithuania) and approaching 40% in Latvia.
In the FSR, with the only exceptions of Belarus and Ukraine, pre-transition inequality was relatively higher and has been growing dramatically during the 90s, exceeding 40% for most of the countries and approaching 50 Gini points for the Russian Federation, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Tajikistan. With the only exception of Belarus, inequality levels in the FSR remain high in the final year available.
Lastly, as far as the Western Balkan Countries are concerned, the uneven patterns of inequality probably also reflects the specific historical events of each country, which also affected heavily their data availability. However, in these countries, the tormented 90s and the first half of the 2000s did not mean remarkable increases in inequality, which remained in 2006 at about 30% in Albania and Croatia, and below 40% in Bosnia & Herzegovina, Macedonia and Serbia.
Identification of Transition Reform Patterns
The EBRD indicators, largely used as measures of progress in transition, are usually collapsed into one indicator, obtained as the unweighted average or the sum of the specific indices. This choice, which implies perfect substitutability between reform areas, relies on the high correlation between the indices and assumes that the single reform patterns progressed at the same speed. This view cannot be considered as satisfactory: correlation is indeed high, but far from being perfect (and ranges from 0.63 to 0.88) and if we look at the reform patterns for single countries, they are far from overlapping (see diagram A1 for some examples; diagrams for the remaining countries are available upon request). Many studies identify countries such as Russia or Poland as examples of shock therapy strategies and Hungary and Slovenia as gradualist approached (e.g., Lavigne, 1999) . However, transition patterns were indeed very country specific, and none of them can be at the end characterized as a full "shock therapy". Lin (2005) uses Poland as an example in which although prices were liberalized, large scale enterprises privatisation lagged behind (p. 241).
Rather, EBRD data reveal that each country followed an own path of transition and highlight ex-post country-specific models of speed and sequencing of reforms. The two concepts (speed and sequencing) cannot be distinguished if one aims at considering the complexity of reform patterns since, from this perspective, speed in one dimension cannot be considered separately from what happened for the other ones. Of course a summary indicator of progress of reforms provides an idea of timing of the transition process, but a variety of possible combinations of single reforms may lay behind. The limited specific literature available provides insights into the inequality effects of single reforms (Milanovic and Ersado, 2011) emphasizing their effects on both wages and profits. Our contention is that their effect cannot be easily identified if each single reform is not considered in connection with the other ones. For example, privatization processes are generally expected to drive inequality upwards, via creation of unemployment pools and increase in wage dispersion (Milanovic, 1998 and Ivanova, 2007) . However, this effect will be lower in those context in which new entries of businesses is relatively easy and therefore partially able to offset unemployment; this, in turn, depends on the competition policy implemented and on the development of financial markets. Provided that transition increased inequality, our concern here is to find out whether different speeds and sequencings of reforms favoured a relatively stronger acceleration of inequality, or not.
As already mentioned, the only previous attempt to consider the inequality effects of transition reforms in a cross-country perspective is Milanovic and Ersado (2011) panel analysis. However, they simply use the 9 EBRD indicators jointly in their regressions (with a serious threat of multicollinearity, not dealt with in the econometrics), and do not address explicitly speed and sequencing aspects. This is instead done by Staehr 6 The transition indicators range from 1 to 4.33 (or 4+), with 1 representing little or no change from a rigid centrally planned economy and 4.33 representing the standards of an industrialised market economy. The choice of using the "transition", instead of the calendar, time is not unusual in the specific literature about speed and sequencing of reforms (see, e.g., Berg et al., 1999) , and in our opinion is strongly preferable. The duration of the first three periods is 5 years: since the beginning of transition varied between countries, the length of the last period is shorter for latecomers, since our time span ends in 2006. EBRD data are available starting from 1989, when some countries had already undertaken some reforms and showed higher than one scores. For them (Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Serbia, Slovenia, FYR Macedonia) T 0 was set in 1989. Similarly, T 0 was set in 1989 for Albania, Czech Republic, Latvia, Romania, Russian Federation and Slovak Republic, since the first EBRD indicators movement was recorded in 1990. T 0 is instead 1990 for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan; and 1992 for Turkmenistan. 7 We first implement the cluster analysis using the Ward linkage method and obtain a seven clusters partition using the usual dendrogram inspection and cluster cutting rules. Then we check the stability of these outcomes with the K-means method, setting the number of clusters to 7 and using the Ward-clusters centroids as seeds. This second analysis provides a partition of the countries identical to the previous one, confirming the stability of the hierarchical clustering. A first important piece of information emerging from the cluster analysis is the polarization of the new Central European EU members and the Baltic countries into two groups (1 and 2), with the exception of Bulgaria and Romania classified in cluster 5 along with Albania, Georgia and Armenia. All the remaining FSU countries are in clusters 4 and 6, and those of former Yugoslavia in groups 3 and 7.
Models of Transition: Discussion and Expected Impacts on Inequality
Clusters one and two contain all the Central and Eastern European countries which joined the EU in 2004, plus the Baltic countries. Cluster 1 includes the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic and Estonia, which in fact had a very similar pattern of transition as revealed by the EBRD data, with a fast pace of reforms being implemented early in all fields simultaneously (with some gradualism in infrastructure reforms only). This suggests that the implementation of those reforms (in particular privatizations, enterprise restructuring, price liberalization) typically associated to increasing inequality via shrinking of the state sector, unfolding of unemployment and wage decompression, marched in step with other dimensions which may have played a counteracting role on inequality. We refer in particular to progress in competition policy which, along with exposure to international competition (TFE), may have prevented the formation of monopolistic positions or eroded the existing ones; to the early development of financial and banking sectors, which may have favoured new entries into the most dynamic sectors and therefore the creation of employment and the improvement in competitive conditions (lower prices, lower rents and profits). Progress in development of financial markets is also usually expected to be pro-equality (Li et al., 1998) , increasing the possibility of worse-off agents to undertake investments (first of all education), which could drive upwards their relative income position. In other words, this balanced approach may have helped, comparatively to other reforms patterns (see below), in containing the unavoidable adverse distributive effects of transition.
Cluster 2 (Hungary, Poland, Latvia and Lithuania) is similar to the previously described one in the sense that various reforms dimensions (SSP, GER, PL, TFE, BR) remarkably progressed in the initial period. Some other reforms, such as largescale privatization, securities and non-banking financial sectors intermediation, and especially competition policy, were instead implemented more smoothly compared to cluster 1. Cluster 6, which includes the Russian Federation and other FSU countries describes a transition picture similar to group 4. However, some reform dimensions, namely competition policy and banking sector development proceed more slowly and at the end of the period were much further from being completed. In addition, across the whole period, progress in privatisations and enterprise restructuring was remarkably weak.
Cluster 5 puts together countries of the FSU in which transition was still lagging behind at the end of the period considered. The only steps forward were undertaken in price and trade liberalisation and in small scale privatisation. Other dimensions of reforms were instead, still at the end of the period considered, not far from the starting point.
Lastly, clusters 7 includes countries that for various reasons underwent important transition discontinuities, related to war episodes and political instability. Progress in reforms was quite uneven across the various fields, with the exceptions of price and trade liberalisation; a certain advancement in the other dimensions was only implemented in the last period considered.
Speed and Sequencing of Reforms and Inequality: Empirical Evidence
In this section we show the approach used to test empirically the impact of reform patterns on inequality. In paragraph 4.1 we discuss how the information about transition approaches derived in the previous section are included in the empirical model and describe the other control variables considered. Section 4.2 illustrates the econometric methods, while in Section 4.3 the results obtained are presented and discussed.
The Empirical Model: Reform Related Variables and Other Control Variables
As far as the information about reform patterns is concerned, we include in the regressions a summary indicator of transition (named EBRD and computed as usual in the literature averaging the 9 transition indicators), along with the interaction variables obtained as the product of EBRD and the dummy variables (CL1, ..., CL7) associated to the seven speed/sequencing models identified. The interpretation of the six interaction terms simultaneously introduced in the regression is straightforward: each of them represents the additional specific (negative or positive) effect produced by a certain pattern of reforms on inequality compared to the reference group (the sixth model/cluster).
The identification of the reference group is of course arbitrary and uninfluential on the outcomes: the choice of cluster 6 is motivated by the fact that it includes the Russian Federation and is therefore an informative benchmark case.
Along with the variables representing reforms speed and sequencing, we obviously include a set of controls accounting for the remaining possible factors affecting inequality during transition. The choice of these explanatory variables and their ability to represent the intended effects are severely limited by data availability. For example, a crucial role might have been played by the approach followed to implement privatisation processes, an aspect not captured by the EBRD data and difficult to include in our cross-country approach. Following Milanovic and Ersado (2011) we included among the regressors: the growth rate of the economy (growth), inflation (inflation), government spending as a share of GDP (govshare), industry structure (agrshare), and a control for war episodes (war).
Deriving expectations about the effects of these variables on inequality is a difficult task in general and in particular when specific time periods (such as transition) are considered. For example, the effects of growth clearly depend on the type of growth that has taken place (neutral, relatively more pro-poor or pro-rich) and the existing literature is controversial. Results from Ersado (2011) and Kimenyi (2006) support the idea that growth was pro-inequality, even though the absolute in-come levels of the poor increased. Other studies provide opposite outcomes (e.g., Ivanschenko, 2002; Verme, 2006) .
Both the specific (e.g., Milanovic and Ersado, 2011; Ivanschenko, 2002) and nonspecific (Bulir, 2001 ) literature on transition supports the idea that high inflation increases inequality, since worse-off people are less able to protect themselves from prices growth.
However, the empirical evidence is mixed (see Galli and van der Hoeven, 2001 , for a review). The countervailing (inequality-reducing) force -i.e., inflation pushing upwards wage earners into higher tax brackets -, however, may not be too powerful in the case of transition countries. This is not only because tax evasion has been very high, but also because progressivity in tax structures is relatively weak (Aristei and Perugini, 2010) . In our case the inflation variable is also a control for the pace and strength of the stabilization policy imposed externally (i.e., by World Bank and International Monetary Fund).
Govshare is instead used to control for the possible cushioning effect provided by government spending and welfare state provisions. A negative relationship of Govshare is expected considering the available literature (e.g., Keane and Prasad, 2002) , even though for some countries social transfers were found to increase market income inequality (Milanovic, 1998) . Our indicator is too general to capture the direct effects of social transfers. However, higher government spending may also correspond to an aggregate demand stimulus, often beneficial to low-skilled sectors (e.g., construction industry), and this may also represent a buffer to widening inequality.
We also include in the analysis an indicator of the industry structure (agrshare) in order to account for the structural change not already captured by the other variables (reforms, growth, macroeconomic developments), but which may control, for example, for demand driven factors, such as the industry mix changes related to unconstrained consumer preferences. The control for civil wars (war) is expected to impact positively on inequality.
A final set of control variables accounts for the differences in the characteristic and methods used in the different surveys from which inequality measures are derived.
They are basically dummy variables controlling for the survey (i) using persons rather than households as units of analysis (Dpers); (ii) calculating inequality on the basis of income, gross earnings (Dearn), or consumption (Dcons); (iii); using equivalence scales (Deqs) or not; (iv) and covering the whole population (Dpop) or not.
The inclusion of these control variable, along with time-specific effects and the use of a panel approach, should assure correct identification of the effects of the reform patterns, which remain the focus of the paper.
Econometric Methods
In order to assess the impact of transition reforms on income inequality we consider the following dynamic model: has analysed the effect of inequality on growth pointing out that a possible problem of reverse causality may arise. Although the specific features of transition (namely the output dynamics driven by structural and systemic changes) suggest that such a possibility can be ruled out (Ivanschenko, 2002) , a recent study has provided support for inequality being detrimental for growth in transition countries (Sukiassyan, 2007) . Simi-larly, a concern of inverse direction of causality may arise between transition reforms and inequality, as emphasised by political economy literature: in transition (see section 2.1) distributive patterns may have affected the pace of reforms. However, other authors (e.g., Milanovic and Ersado, 2011) emphasise that transition dynamics was in most cases dictated from outside (e.g., by WB or IMF constrains) and that therefore the role of inequality could be considered irrelevant. Lastly, concerns of reverse causality can be raised, as already discussed, with respect to the link between economic inequality and government spending.
To deal with all these issues simultaneously, Generalized-Method-of-Moments (GMM) estimation techniques can be employed. Firstly, the first-difference GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) , which is based on first-differencing the regression equation to eliminate the country-specific effect and uses lagged dependent variables as instruments, can be considered. For the aim of the present analysis, the main issue of using this estimator is related to the specific nature of inequality persistency: the crosssectional variation embodies a large part of the information since within-country inequality is quite persistent. In this respect, although the first-difference GMM estimator allows controlling for possible measurement errors, country-specific heterogeneity and endogeneity bias, it does not exploit the variation in levels. Thus, ignoring cross-sectional variation may affect the precision of the estimates and give rise to estimation biases, especially if most of the variation in the data is due to cross-country differences 8 . Moreover, as pointed out by Blundell and Bond (1998) , the lagged levels of the explanatory variables are weak instruments for the variables in differences when explanatory variables are per-
The system GMM estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) allows to address these shortcomings, exploiting the cross-country variation in the data. In the system-GMM approach specifications in first-differences and in levels are combined.
8 Deininger and Squire (1996) and Li et al. (1998) show that in non-transition countries most of the variation in inequality (close to 90%) is usually due to variation across countries. For transition economies the time dimension is more relevant, but cross-country variability still remains a substantial source of the variation in the period considered. 9 Bond et al. (2001) show that in small samples such weak instruments issue further translate into a large finite sample bias.
First-differencing eliminates the fixed effect in the model and controls for unobserved heterogeneity and time-invariant measurement errors, while adding the original equation in levels preserves the cross-country dimension, which is lost when only the first differenced equation is estimated. The system GMM estimator uses internal instruments (i.e., lagged values of the endogenous explanatory variables) and thus requires a more stringent set of restrictions than the difference GMM. The equations in levels are, in fact, instrumented with the lagged first differences of the corresponding explanatory variables and, in order to consider these additional moments as valid instruments for levels, the identifying assumption that past changes of the explanatory variables are uncorrelated with current errors in levels is required (Roodman, 2009) . If the moment conditions are valid, Blundell and Bond (1998) show that the system GMM estimator performs significantly better than the first difference GMM estimator. The validity of the moment conditions can be tested by means of the test of overidentifying restrictions proposed by Sargan (1958) 
In the application, due to data constraints, we will include only one lag of growth and govshare (i.e., E 2k E 3k 0 for k ! 1) as additional regressors. This also provides a robustness check for the empirical model as it allows to verify whether the inclusion of additional lagged controls substantially changes empirical results.
System GMM estimation requires several specification choices. In particular,
given the structure of our panel, in which N is only slightly larger than T, we use the one-step estimator 10 and correct the standard errors to take account for small-sample bias and heteroschedasticity, by applying the Huber and White robust variance estimator. Furthermore, Roodman (2009) discusses the problem of the overfitting bias caused by instrument proliferation in dynamic panels. In fact, system GMM uses all available instruments and the number of instruments increases quadratic to the number of time points. To overcome this issue, we use a combined strategy obtained by collapsing instruments (i.e., creating one instrument for each variable and lag distance only, with 0 substituted for any missing values) and restricting the number of lags used as instruments. By doing this the number of instruments used turns to be invariant in T.
As in most empirical studies on inequality, the estimation of models [1] and [2] is based on an unbalanced and unequally spaced panel dataset, described in Section 3.1. It is worth remarking that, although in the empirical application we have aimed at properly addressing the main issues arising from the structure of the dataset, all the data limitations discussed should be kept in mind in interpreting the results. In particular, the use of a panel of unequally spaced spells, while allowing to keep the sample size reasonable high, could lead to an over representation of countries with a large number of observation and to inconsistent estimates if one period in the theoretical model has to perfectly correspond to a certain time span in empirical data (Tamm et al., 2007) .
Outcomes and Interpretations
Outcomes of the estimation of equations [1] and [2] are reported in Table 1 . These specifications (as well as all the remaining ones presented) include time-specific effects and controls for the features of the surveys from which inequality measures are obtained, whose estimated coefficients are not reported. In the estimations we treat growth, the share of government spending on GDP and transition reform index as endogenous variables. The instruments set used includes: levels of the explanatory variables lagged two periods and further lags until four for the differenced equation; and explanatory variables in first differ-10 As pointed out by Roodman (2009) , in the two-step variant the number of elements to be estimated for the optimal weighting matrix is quadratic in the number of instruments and quartic in T. Moreover, the optimal weighting matrix has a rank of N at most and therefore, if the number of instruments exceeds N, it is singular and the two-step estimator can be computed only by means of a generalized inverse of the weighting matrix, which significantly affects the asymptotic efficiency of the two step estimator.
ences lagged one period for the level equation. The first two columns of Table 1 A first remarkable piece of information emerging from the outcomes is the positive and highly significant effect of the lagged dependent variable, which is a clear-cut indication and confirmation of the high persistence of income inequality and of the appropriateness of a dynamic approach. The results related to the control variables reveal that both govshare and growth have a negative impact on inequality. This suggests that higher government shares of GDP may have played a buffer role towards the inequality generated and fed by other forces. Similarly, the results for GDP growth support the idea that output growth has been relatively more pro-poor (or that output collapse affected relatively more the better-off segments). The industry structure variable (agrshare) is significant and the positive effect suggests that, for those countries in which de-industrialization took place more intensively, the effects on the labour market hit the poor relatively more. Also the dummy variable war is significant and, in line with the findings of Ivaschenko (2002), supports the evidence that civil conflicts and war are associated with rising income inequality. , but they will not be correlated with
Thus if the model is correctly specified, we expect to reject the null hypothesis of no first order autocorrelation and to not reject the hypothesis of no second order autocorrelation. 12 The Wald tests for the joint significance of the two lagged regressors are equal to On the other hand, inflation (inflation) is prevalently non-significant; this is contrary to the evidence provided by Ersado (2011) and Bhattacharya et.al. (2005) , but in line with other empirical findings (Gustafsson and Johansson, 1999; Nikoloski, 2010) .
Lastly, it is worth remarking that time dummies are jointly significantly different from zero and, among the variables controlling for the surveys differences, Dearn and Dpers proved to be steadily significant. Turning to the analysis of the effects of reforms on inequality, the indicator summarizing transition reforms (EBRD) has a positive and significant impact on inequality, revealing that the reforms associated with the transition process, once fundamental macroeconomic factors are controlled for, led to an increase in income inequality. However, the main interest here is the analysis of the different patterns of reforms speed and sequencing, which we conjecture to have heterogeneous impacts on inequality. In particular, in columns 2 and 4 we present the results obtained by including interactions between the average EBRD index and dummies for groups of countries as identified by the cluster analysis. The estimated coefficients of these interaction variables should be interpreted as the difference in the average impact of reforms on inequality with respect to the omitted group (cluster 6), which includes the Russian Federation.
Results reveal remarkable heterogeneity in the estimated effects of reform approaches on inequality. First of all, the impact of reforms was significantly less proinequality in the countries identified with clusters 1 and 2, in which the various transition dimensions marched relatively more in step. This could be interpreted as empirical evidence of the countervailing role hypothesised for specific reforms (financial sectors development, competition policy, exposure to competitive pressures) implemented simultaneously with those typically inequality enhancing. Also the difference in the coefficients size between the two groups addresses towards this interpretation, since the stronger inequality-curbing role of reforms in the countries of cluster 1 may be connected to the relatively more coordinated timing of reforms in competition policy and financial sector (with respect to other transition dimensions and compared to cluster 2).
The evidence of such a remarkable role of reform patterns in containing inequality particularly in the Czech and the Slovak Republic is, in our opinion, a distinctive outcome of our study, since it helps in shedding light on the causes of the surprisingly small rise in inequality observed in these countries during transition.
Results also indicate that the countries belonging to cluster 3 undertook a reform approach relatively more pro-inequality compared to early EU members and Baltic countries, but still weaker compared to the benchmark group. We have already commented on the fact that in the countries classified in cluster 3 some distributive effects could have unfolded before the beginning of the period considered here as a result of privatisations and liberalisations previously implemented; afterwards, the resulting unbalanced reform pattern could have produced distributive outcomes more unequal compared to those in clusters 1 and 2.
The transition model identified with cluster 4 is the one most similar to benchmark group (number 6); and confirms the stronger pro-inequality effects of reforms compared to the first three clusters. This could be justified with the remarkably weaker and later role played by some reform dimensions (namely financial sector and competition policy development), as explained in section 3.3. However, the transition impact of this approach is still significantly different and lower compared to the benchmark case.
This might depend on the fact that in Russia, and in the remaining countries classified in cluster 6, the possibly inequality-compensating reforms proceed even more slowly and at the end of the period were much further from being completed. In addition, across the whole period, progress in privatisations and enterprise restructuring was really weak and this favoured the well-known stagnation of large sections of the economy in lowproductivity/low-wage traps, not triggering any dynamism of the private sector which has normally compensated, in later stages of transition, the initial rise in inequality associated to entering into market systems.
Clusters 5 and 7 include the countries whose transition patterns produced inequality effects stronger than the reference group. As discussed earlier, the former puts together countries in which transition is still lagging behind and is almost exclusively identified with price and trade liberalisation; the interpretation proposed to explain the strong pro-inequality effect of transition for the countries of cluster 6 are reinforced here, since no compensating institutional dimensions seems to be entered into force yet.
The positive sign of the coefficient associated to cluster 7 could be interpreted in a similar vein, but adding that also social and political instability during the transition process may have played a role.
Final Remarks
This paper is an attempt to measure the effects of different models of transition on income inequality. The specific original contribution of the paper lies on the identification of common patterns of transition, defined on the basis of the speed of reform of each dimension and on the temporal structure of their implementation. One intermediate outcome of our analysis is that patterns of transition towards a market economy were strongly diversified across countries, both in terms of speed and sequencing of reforms. Consequently, the shock therapy/gradualism juxtaposition can be only considered as a conceptualization useful to providing reference points, whereas the actual reform patterns always implied a complex mix of speed and timing of the single reforms components.
Using a cluster analysis on the dynamics of each of the 9 EBRD transition indicators over four phases of transition, we were able to identify seven different model of transition. These are actual transition patters occurred in formerly planned economies, as revealed ex-post by progress in reforms observed during the 90s and the first half of the years 2000. Our econometric results provide evidence that transition reforms in general have significantly increased income inequality and this corroborates the existing empirical and theoretical literature. Our original result is that different patterns of transition affected inequality at different strengths, in the sense that some model of transition favoured relatively more an increase in inequality, while others did less. In particular, transition was relatively more pro-inequality when price and trade liberalizations and privatization were not accompanied by progress in competition policy and development of financial markets, which lagged behind or were implemented in later stages. From this point of view (i.e., ability to keep inequality growth relatively low), the transition patterns of most of the countries of central and Eastern Europe can be considered more successful compared to those of the Former Soviet Republics and of the Western Balkan countries. Our outcomes suggest that more balanced and coordinated transition approaches were relatively more able in restraining the unavoidable rise in inequality associated to giving up central planning.
From this point of view, this study contributes to the debate on the most desirable patterns of transition, which has been so far almost completely confined to their effects on growth. However, on the policy side, if income inequality affects subsequent growth in some respect (positively or negatively), as emphasized by a very extensive literature, this side effect of transition cannot be neglected. Especially if, as recently shown with specific reference to transition countries (Sukiassyan, 2007) , higher inequality may be harmful for growth. 
